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Case No. 20161019-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

JEREMY BOWDEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
While running from the police, Defendant fired six shots at Officer
Cory Tsouras, hitting him in the chest once. Fortunately, Officer Tsouras was
wearing a bullet-proof vest. At trial, the State presented 18 witnesses and 191
exhibits that detailed the shooting. The State also presented evidence of
Defendant’s flight from police and how Defendant was identified as the
shooter.
On appeal, Defendant first challenges his attempted aggravated
murder conviction, arguing that insufficient evidence supported his
identification as the shooter. In an unpreserved claim, Defendant challenges
his obstruction of justice conviction, arguing that, like his attempted

aggravated murder conviction, insufficient evidence supported his
identification as the person who discarded the gun. Both claims fail for the
same reasons. A video showed Defendant firing a gun in the direction of
Tsouras, the gun used in the shooting was found near where Defendant
jumped a retaining wall while fleeing police, Defendant was the only person
in the area fleeing, and one of the bullet casing recovered from the scene
matched a bullet found in the truck Defendant had stolen.
Defendant next challenges the trial court’s admission of the Federal
bullet that police found in Defendant’s pocket when they arrested him.
Defendant argues that the trial court should have excluded the bullet as
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. But the bullet was circumstantial evidence
linking Defendant to the crime—it was the same brand as bullets found in the
truck Defendant had stolen.
Last, Defendant argues that the trial court should have merged all five
of his felony discharge of a firearm convictions with his attempted
aggravated murder conviction. But the aggravated murder statute explicitly
prohibits merging felony discharge of a firearm with aggravated murder.
Defendant got a windfall when the court merged one.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1a. Defendant was tried for the attempted murder of police officer
Tsouras. Among other evidence, (1) a video showed Defendant firing a gun
in the direction of Tsouras, (2) Defendant was the only person in the area
fleeing, and (3) one of the bullet casings recovered from the scene matched a
bullet found in the truck Defendant had stolen. Was the evidence sufficient
to support the jury’s attempted aggravated murder verdict?
Standard of Review. This Court must “review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury.” State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
Issue 1b. Was the evidence so plainly insufficient that the trial court
erred in submitting the obstruction of justice charge to the jury where the
evidence was sufficient to submit the obstruction charge to the jury?
Standard of Review. On unpreserved sufficiency challenges, Defendant
“must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction,” and “second that the insufficiency was so obvious and
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury.” See
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶17, 10 P.3d 346.
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Issue 1c. Did the trial court erroneously deny Defendant’s motion to
exclude the Federal bullet found in his pocket?
Standard of Review. This Court upholds the trial court’s evidentiary
ruling unless “the trial court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood
that injustice resulted.” State v. Otterson, 2008 UT App 139, ¶14, 184 P.3d 604
(quotations and citations omitted).
Issue 2. Did the trial court erroneously deny Defendant’s motion to
merge his four felony discharge of a firearm convictions with his attempted
aggravated murder conviction?
Standard of Review. “[W]hether one crime is a lesser included offense,
which merges with a greater included offense, is a legal question of statutory
interpretation reviewed for correctness.” State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶6, 122
P.3d 615.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of relevant facts.2
While running from the police, Defendant shot Officer Cory Tsouras in
the chest. R801-07,816-17.
******

Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are recited in the light
most favorable to the verdict. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶3, 299 P.3d 892.
2
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In October 2015, Defendant stole a truck and “six or seven” guns from
the truck owner’s house. R1121-22. However, Defendant did not steal from
the truck owner a 9 mm handgun—the type of weapon used to shoot and
shoot at Officer Tsouras. Id., R1127; State’s Exhibit (SE)161.
A few weeks later, on October 30, 2015, around 8 p.m., Defendant,
wearing a bandana, a dark leather jacket, a red or maroon shirt, blue jeans,
and white shoes, drove the stolen truck to a business center at a strip mall.
R843, see also 1310 (At trial, Defendant admitted that he was at the business
center and on surveillance video); SE12,151-153.
Officer Nathan Clark was in the business center parking lot when he
noticed the stolen truck. R843; SE11,143. As Clark investigated whether the
truck was stolen, Defendant walked up to the truck and opened the driver
side door. R854; SE11. When Defendant saw Clark, he ran. R854; SE11. Clark
informed dispatch that he was chasing a white male in his thirties wearing
blue jeans, a bandana, and a black leather jacket. R855; SE11.
Defendant ran through two adjacent parking lots towards a retail store.
R855-56.
Officer Cory Tsouras, in response to Clark’s dispatch parked nearby
and could see that Defendant—and only Defendant—was running from
Clark. R789-90; SE11. Tsouras watched Defendant run to the adjacent retail
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store parking lot. R797,855-56. There, Defendant bumped into the retail
store’s night manager, and told her to “get the fuck out of my way.” R1195.
The manager did not see anyone else running in the area and described
Defendant as “taller,” with a “pointed nose,” “sharp looking, almost like
wolf’s eyes,” wearing “dark pants,” and a dark jacket. R1195,1198-99.
As Defendant ran through the retail store’s parking lot, Tsouras drove
to the retail store to pursue Defendant. R798. When Tsouras saw Defendant—
a male matching the description Clark gave, wearing a black jacket, blue
jeans, and a “beanie, skull cap-type head gear”—run into tire store parking
lot, he pursued him in his patrol car. R797-98,800; SE142.
Gary Midgely, who was across the street, watched Defendant run from
the retail store parking lot to the tire store. R938; SE13,145. Midgely saw only
Defendant running in the area. R940. Midgely described Defendant wearing
dark pants and a jacket and was not “100 percent sure,” but thought the jacket
was light-colored. R941,953-54. Midgely explained that he was focused on
what Defendant was doing, not what he was wearing. R952. Midgely saw
Tsouras’s patrol car catch up with Defendant in the tire store’s parking lot,
but the patrol car blocked his view of Defendant. R941-42,943; SE145.
However, Midgely could still see Tsouras’s patrol car and heard six to eight
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rapid gunshots as soon as Tsouras’s patrol car was parallel with Defendant.
R942-43,944; SE145.
When Defendant ran on the passenger side his patrol car, Tsouras saw
the muzzle of Defendant’s gun flash and radioed “shots fired, shots fired.”
R801-02; SE11. It was 8:32 p.m. R1160; SE11. Tsouras did not stop to engage
Defendant, but instead drove away from Defendant because the patrol car is
“literally a coffin.” R803,943; SE143. As he drove to the adjacent carwash
parking lot, Tsouras heard Defendant fire four more times and saw three
more muzzle flashes from Defendant’s gun. R804-05.
Officer Andrew O’Gwin responded to the tire store parking lot just as
Tsouras drove away and Defendant continued to fire at Tsouras. R945,1210.
O’Gwin saw Defendant—wearing blue jeans, a dark hoodie, and white
shoes—shoot his gun multiple times. R1210-12,1223; SE147.
Defendant fired six shots at Tsouras. R1052-55,1072. “Every single
window” in Tsouras’s patrol car was either “blown out or shattered.”
R863,1056; SE33. Four bullets hit Tsouras’s patrol car; one of those bullets hit
Tsouras in the chest. R1095-96; SE136-141,156,157.
The bullet that hit Tsouras entered the front passenger-side door of his
patrol car, went through the laptop sitting in the front passenger seat, and hit

-7-

Tsouras in the chest. R1081-82,1091-92; SE95,110-114. Tsouras’ bulletproof
vest stopped the bullet. R816-17;R154,157; SE135-141,157.
A second bullet hit the passenger-side back window and ricocheted off
the printer that sat on top of the front passenger seat headrest. R1080-81,108691,1098; SE78-83,100-109. The bullet then fragmented into two pieces. R108081. Both bullet fragments entered Tsouras’s headrest, with one lodging in
Tsouras’s headrest and the other exiting out the back driver-side window.
R1081; SE95. The third bullet hit the passenger-side front wheel well.
R1060,1081-96; SE48,91-93,115-118. The fourth bullet hit the passenger-side
top right corner of the patrol car. R1060-61,1083,1096; SE49,89,90.
The fifth and sixth bullets did not hit either Tsouras or the patrol car,
but their casings were found in the tire store’s parking lot. R1052-55; SE1319,21-28,30,31. All the bullets came from the same Hi-point 9 mm handgun.
R1072-73. One bullet was a 9 mm Ruger and the other five bullets were 9 mm
Winchesters. R19,22,23,26,28,31.
After shooting Tsouras, Defendant ran and disappeared from
Tsouras’s view. R804. Tsouras thought he saw Defendant at the carwash and
shot at the person that he thought was Defendant, but instead of shooting
Defendant, Tsouras mistakenly shot an innocent bystander. R807.
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However, Defendant did not run towards the carwash. He ran to the
north side of the tire store parking lot. R1210-11; SE147. O’Gwin saw
Defendant running and commanded him to “Get on the ground” several
times. R1212. Defendant ignored O’Gwin’s commands and ducked behind a
dumpster. R1213-14; SE147. Defendant then fired at O’Gwin and jumped the
retaining wall into the Park Station Apartments. R1213-14; SE147. O’Gwin’s
dash cam did not capture Defendant’s face, but showed Defendant wearing
blue jeans, a dark jacket, and white shoes and firing his gun towards the
carwash—the same direction that Tsouras drove—and jumping the retaining
wall. R804-05; SE147.
One minute after Tsouras radioed “shots fired,” a containment area
was set-up. R1160-62; SE11. A containment area is like a “human fence,”
where officers are positioned to keep an area enclosed to contain a potential
suspect. R901,999,1161-62. Over thirty officers responded to the containment
area that was north, east, west, and south of the tire store. R1160-61. Officers
stationed in the containment area radioed that they saw Defendant north of
the tire store near the Brighton Place Apartments. R902-03; see SE2.
Two officers stationed at the Brighton Place Apartment as part of the
containment area saw Defendant—bald, wearing a maroon t-shirt, and
jeans—jump over a fence into the Brighton Place Apartments and run.
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R968,972-73,989-990. The officers chased Defendant through the apartment
complex and found him in the courtyard. R973. When one officer asked
Defendant for his name and tried to detain him, Defendant ran. R974-76. The
officers then chased Defendant through the apartment complex. R978-979. As
they chased him, both officers yelled at Defendant to “stop” and “taser,
taser.” R976. One officer deployed his taser and hit Defendant, but Defendant
ripped the taser cords off and kept running. R976-77. The officers chased
Defendant to the back of the apartment complex and found him pacing by
the fence line. R979,998; SE3. One officer told Defendant multiple times to
“get on the ground,” but Defendant ignored him. R980. The other officer then
tased Defendant twice. Id. The officers then arrested Defendant. Id. At the
time of his arrest, Defendant’s hands were bloodied, and a .45 caliber Federal
bullet was found in his pocket. R1002, 1164; SE121-122. Twenty-two minutes
separated the shooting and Defendant’s arrest. R1160.
After Defendant’s arrest, the stolen truck was searched. Defendant’s
identification, Ipad, fifteen guns, gun parts, and various makes, calibers, and
types of ammunition, including four 9 mm bullets and various calibers of
Ruger, Winchester, and

Federal bullets, were found. R1105-14,1136-40;

SE73,160-189. Some, but not all, of the guns belonged the truck’s owner.
R1121-30. But the truck’s owner had never owned a 9 mm handgun or 9 mm
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ammunition. R1127,1130. One of the 9 mm bullets found in the truck was
made by the same manufacturer as one of the bullet casings found at the
shooting scene. R1146-1148; SE19,189
The Park Station Apartments—where Defendant jumped the retaining
wall—were also searched. R911-13. Police found a Hi-point 9 mm handgun
and its magazine on top of the covered parking near the place where
Defendant jumped the retaining wall. R912-13; SE144; see also R1068-69 (At
trial, Defendant stipulated that this weapon was used in the shooting). After
the Park Station Apartments and the rest of the containment area were
searched, approximately sixteen minutes after Defendant’s arrest, the
containment area was dismantled. R1187.
The gun, magazine, and bullet casings recovered from the shooting
scene were tested for touch DNA. R921-22. The DNA tests excluded
Defendant from the magazine and could neither include or exclude
Defendant from the gun and the casings. R923-26.
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court.
Defendant was charged with attempted aggravated murder, a first
degree felony; receiving a stolen vehicle and obstructing justice, both second
degree felonies; five counts of felony discharge of a firearm, all third degree
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felonies; and failure to stop at the command of law enforcement, a class A
misdemeanor. R35-37.
Motion to exclude the Federal bullet. During trial, Defendant moved
to exclude the .45 caliber Federal bullet found in his pocket when he was
arrested. R955. Defendant argued that admitting the bullet would be more
prejudicial than probative under Utah R. Evid. 403. Id. The court denied
Defendant’s motion. R964. The court did not rule that the evidence was not
unfairly prejudicial given the totality of the evidence. Id.
Directed verdict motion. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant
moved for a directed verdict. R1225. Defendant argued that the State had not
proven that he was the shooter. Id. In response, the State argued that
Defendant’s identity was established by O’Gwin’s dash cam showing
Defendant wearing exactly what he’s wearing at the business center and
firing in Tsouras’ direction, that Defendant was found shortly after the
shooting in the containment area, and that Defendant was the only person
seen running through the tire store parking lot. R1225-26.
The trial court denied the motion. Id. The court acknowledged that
“some” descriptions changed “from witness to witness.” R1226. However,
the court found that there was “sufficient evidence” for a reasonable jury to
convict Defendant even with the inconsistent descriptions because each
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witness “had an opportunity” to observe Defendant and the State has “put
on a prima facie case … for each of the counts as charged.” Id.
The jury then convicted Defendant as charged. R419-21.
Defendant’s merger motion. Following the jury’s verdict, Defendant
moved to merge his five felony discharge of a firearm convictions with his
attempted aggravated murder conviction. R435-45. The State opposed the
motion. R448-51. But the State argued in the alternative that it was “fair to
merge a single count of discharge of a firearm into the attempted aggravated
murder charge and vacate that single count” because the basis for attempted
aggravated murder could have been either the bullet that went into the
driver-side headrest or the one that hit Tsouras. R451.
The court agreed with the State’s alternative argument. R490-91. The
court merged one count of felony discharge of a firearm into Defendant’s
attempted aggravated murder conviction then vacated that one count of
felony discharge of a firearm. R491.
Sentencing. For his attempted aggravated murder conviction, the
court sentenced Defendant to five-years-to-life in prison. R457. For his
receiving a stolen vehicle and obstructing justice convictions, the court
sentenced Defendant to two terms of one-to-fifteen-years in prison. R457-58.
For his four felony discharge of a firearm convictions, the court sentenced
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Defendant to four terms of zero-to-five-years in prison. R458. The court
ordered Defendant’s attempted aggravated murder, receiving a stolen
vehicle, and obstructing justice convictions to run consecutively, and his
felony discharge of a firearm convictions to run concurrently to one another
and to his other convictions. R458. For his failure to stop at the command of
law enforcement conviction, the court ordered Defendant to serve 365 days
in jail. R1395.
Defendant timely appealed. R466-67.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point 1. Defendant challenges his attempted aggravated murder and
obstruction of justice convictions. He also challenges the trial court’s denial
of his motion to exclude the Federal bullet found in his pocket.
In a preserved claim, Defendant argues that insufficient evidence
supported his attempted aggravated murder conviction because the evidence
was too circumstantial to identify him as the person who shot Officer
Tsouras. Defendant’s claim fails. It is well-settled that circumstantial
evidence alone is sufficient to establish guilt. And here, Defendant’s
identification was supported by, among other evidence, multiple witnesses’
testimony that a person dressed the same or similarly to Defendant was the
only person running from police and shot in Tsouras’s direction, videos, that
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that one of the bullets found in the truck Defendant stole was made by the
same manufacture as one of the bullet casings found at the scene, and that
Defendant was arrested with bloody hands, a bullet in his pocket, and close
in time and proximity to the shooting scene.
In an unpreserved claim, Defendant argues that insufficient evidence
supported his obstruction of justice conviction because, like his attempted
aggravated murder conviction, the evidence was too circumstantial identify
him as the person who discarded the gun used to shoot Tsouras. On this
record, Defendant cannot show that the insufficiency was so obvious and
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury.
Ample evidence supported that Defendant discarded the gun, including that
the gun used to shoot Tsouras was found next to where Defendant jumped
the retaining wall between the tire store and the Park Station Apartments.
Defendant argues under Utah R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, and 404 that the
trial court erred when it did not exclude the Federal bullet found in his
pocket. Rules 401, 402, 403, and 404 apply to extrinsic evidence—evidence of
other bad acts. Here, the bullet was intrinsic to Defendant’s crimes, thus, Utah
R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, and 404 do not apply. The trial court properly admitted
the bullet where it was found on Defendant’s person, tied him to the stolen
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truck, and was evidence of his access to and familiarity with guns and
ammunition.
Point 2. Below, the trial court merged one of Defendant’s five felony
discharge of a firearm convictions with his attempted aggravated murder
conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it did
not merge his remaining four felony discharge of a firearm convictions with
his attempted aggravated murder conviction.
Defendant’s claim fails because the aggravated murder statute
explicitly prohibits merger of felony discharge of a firearm and aggravated
murder. And Defendant’s conviction for the attempt crime does not change
that analysis where a conviction for attempted aggravated murder must
satisfy the aggravated murder statute elements, except that the murder need
not be completed.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE STATE PRODUCED AMPLE EVIDENCE TO LINK
DEFENDANT TO THE SHOOTING OF A POLICE OFFICER AND
CONCEALING THE EVIDENCE OF THE SHOOTING.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
attempted aggravated murder and obstruction of justice convictions.
Br.Aplt.13-30. In a preserved claim, Defendant argues that insufficient
evidence supported his attempted aggravated murder conviction because the
evidence was too circumstantial to identify him as the person who shot
Officer Tsouras. Br.Aplt.13-27. In an unpreserved claim, Defendant argues
that insufficient evidence supported his obstruction of justice conviction
because, like his attempted aggravated murder conviction, the evidence was
too circumstantial to identify him as the person who discarded the gun used
to shoot Tsouras. Br.Aplt.27-30. Defendant also argues that the trial court
erroneously rejected his argument that evidence that police found the Federal
brand bullet in his pocket was more prejudicial than probative. Br.Aplt.30-43.
But the evidence showed, among other things, that a person dressed
the same or similarly to Defendant was the only person running from police
and shot in Tsouras’s direction. Police also found a 9mm bullet casing at the
scene that was made by the same manufacture as one of the four 9mm bullets
found in the truck Defendant had stolen. The truck owner had never owned
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a 9mm gun. While the casings found at the scene were not from Federal brand
bullets, there were Federal brand bullets in the truck. Finding a Federal brand
bullet in Defendant’s truck was further circumstantial evidence linking him
to the truck where police found a 9mm bullet bearing the same marking as
those used to shoot and shoot at Officer Tsouras.
A. Ample evidence supports Defendant’s attempted aggravated
murder conviction.3
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court gives
“substantial deference to the jury.” State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶18, 349 P.3d
664 (quotation and citation omitted). This Court “reviews the evidence and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
verdict.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶177, 299 P.3d 892 (quotation and
citation omitted). The existence of “contradictory evidence or of conflicting
inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury’s verdict.” State v. Howell, 649
P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1982). So reviewed, evidence will not support a jury verdict
only when it “is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime.” State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)
(quotation and citation omitted). Thus, this Court must affirm if “some

3

This Point responds to Defendant’s Point I. See Br.Aplt.13-30.
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evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of
the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maestas, 2012 UT 46,
¶177 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
It makes no difference whether the evidence is solely circumstantial.
It is “well-settled” that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to establish
guilt. State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶57, 397 P.3d 626 (citation and
quotation

omitted).

The

State

may

present

“a

mosaic

of circumstantial evidence that considered as a whole constitutes proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
“Circumstantial evidence may even be more convincing than direct
testimony.” State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (Utah 1978).
It is also “well-established” that identification can be proven from
circumstantial evidence. State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ¶23 n.2, 354 P.3d 791.
A “direct, in-court identification, therefore, is not required.” Id. A “witness
need not physically point out a defendant so long as the evidence is sufficient
to permit the inference that the person on trial was the person who committed
the crime.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted); see also United States v. Smith,
134 F.3d 384, *3, 1998 WL 33862, 98 CJ C.A.R. 548 (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998)
(“[T]here is no requirement of an in-court identification when other evidence
permits the inference that the defendant is the person who committed the
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offense.”); United States v. Weed, 689 F.2d 752, 754 (7thCir.1982)
(“[I]dentification can be inferred from all the facts and circumstances that are
in evidence.”).
Here, more than “some evidence” established that Defendant shot and
shot at Officer Tsouras. See Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶177 (emphasis added).
Multiple witnesses described and video recordings captured a single person
wearing jeans, a dark jacket, bandana, red or maroon shirt, and white shoes;
when he was arrested, Defendant was still wearing jeans, a red shirt, and
white shoes. R797,855,867,941,973,1198-99,1210; SE12,147.
Defendant, who admits that he was at the business center, was first
captured on the business center’s surveillance video wearing a bandana,
leather jacket, red or maroon shirt, blue jeans, and white shoes. R1310; SE12.
Clark, who saw Defendant at the business center, described Defendant as a
white male, in his thirties, wearing blues jeans, a bandana, and a leather
jacket. R855. The night manager described the person she saw as “taller,”
with a “pointed nose,” “sharp looking …wolf’s eyes,” wearing dark pants,”
and a dark jacket—a description that matches Defendant’s facial features and
clothing. R1195,1198-99; SE120. Tsouras and O’Gwin both described a person
dressed the same or similarly to Defendant. Tsouras described the person he
saw as wearing a “black jacket,” “blue jeans,” and “a beanie—skull cap—type
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headgear.” R797. O’Gwin described the person he saw wearing blue jeans
and a dark hoodie. R1210. And although O’Gwin’s dash cam did not capture
Defendant’s face, it captured a person dressed like Defendant—wearing a
dark jacket, blue jeans, and white shoes. SE147. Moreover, when Defendant
was arrested, he was wearing a red or maroon t-shirt and blue jeans—exactly
what he was wearing at the business center. R973; SE12.
The business center’s surveillance video and O’Gwin’s dash cam match
the witnesses’ descriptions. The videos and Defendant’s post-arrest photo
also show the same person. SE12,120,151-153. The witness descriptions are
consistent and match what Defendant was wearing at different points in his
crime spree. At the beginning of his crime spree, Defendant was wearing
exactly what Clark, the night manager, Tsouras, and O’Gwin described and
the business center and O’Gwin’s videos captured. At his arrest, Defendant
was wearing the same red or maroon t-shirt, blue jeans, and white shoes that
he wore at the business center, on O’Gwin’s dash cam video, and that the
arresting officer described. Merely because Defendant started at the business
center wearing a bandana, jacket, blue jeans, red or maroon shirt, and white
shoes, but was arrested without the bandana or jacket, but still wearing blue
jeans, a red or maroon shirt, and white shoes does not materially undermine
the identification. It would have been reasonable for the jury to infer that
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Defendant discarded his jacket and bandana as he ran. See Ashcraft, 2015 UT
5, ¶18 (reasonable inferences may be drawn from circumstantial evidence).
As the arresting officer explained, when suspects run from the police they
often discard items and items like hats are easily lost. R985.
The identification was also not materially undermined by Midgely’s
testimony that he “thought” the person he saw running from police was
wearing a light-colored jacket, not a dark jacket like the other witnesses
described. R952-53. See Brown, 948 P.2d at 343 (variation in witnesses
testimony does not make it “sufficiently inconclusive” or “inherently
improbable.”) (quotation and citation omitted); Howell, 649 P.2d at 96
(“existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not
warrant disturbing the jury's verdict”) (quotation and citation omitted). As
Midgely explained, he was not focused on what Defendant was wearing, but
on what he was doing. R952-53. Midgely’s vantage point and the lighting also
explain the difference in his description—he was the furthest away and
watching Defendant run at night through parking lots. R938-942; SE13 (taco
bell across the street from shooting site),145. And the remaining witnesses
were materially consistent with each other.
O’Gwin’s dash cam video also supports the identification of Defendant
as the shooter. As stated, the dash cam did not capture Defendant’s face. But
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it did capture a person dressed in the same clothes that Defendant wore at
the business center firing his gun in the direction that Tsouras retreated when
Defendant started shooting. R804-05,1211-13,1221-23, SE12,142,147.
The bullet casings found at the scene and the ammunition found in
truck Defendant had stolen also linked him to the crimes. Defendant
admitted at trial that he was connected to the stolen truck. SE73. Indeed,
Defendant’s identification and Ipad were found inside. R1105; SE73,160. And
the stolen truck connects Defendant to the shooting. One of the bullet casings
found at the scene matched one of the four 9 mm bullets found in the stolen
truck. R1147-48. The truck’s owner testified that the 9 mm bullets were not
his, and that he had never owned a 9 mm gun. R1130. The stolen truck also
contained various calibers of Winchester ammunition—the other type of 9
mm ammunition used in the shooting. R110, SE173-175. And like the .45
caliber Federal bullet in Defendant’s pocket, the stolen truck contained
Federal bullets. R1112; SE175,176,179,186,189.
Additionally, Defendant’s flight from police is evidence that he was the
one who shot Tsouras. State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 38-39 (Utah 1987)
(overturned on other grounds by State v. Robertson, 2017 UT 27); State v. Bales,
675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983). Defendant was the only person in the area
running and the only person in the containment area that matched the
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shooter’s description. R795,940,1162-63,1195,1214; SE147. Defendant was
arrested only twenty-two minutes after the shooting, in the containment area,
near the shooting site, with bloodied hands and a bullet in his pocket.
R980,1002,1160,1164; SE121,122.
Last, Defendant offered no innocent explanation for running from
police or for the injuries to his hand. Compare SE12,151-153 with 120-122.
Thus, the evidence—the surveillance and dash cam videos, the witness
testimony identifying a person wearing the same or similar clothing, that one
of the 9 mm bullets at the scene was made by the same manufacteur as one
of the four 9 mm bullets found in the truck Defendant stole, that Defendant
was the only person in the area, Defendant’s flight from police, Defendant’s
own admissions, and that Defendant was arrested with bloody hands, a
bullet in his pocket, and close in time and proximity to the shooting scene—
established that Defendant shot Tsouras.
Regardless, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient
because there were some inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony
describing Defendant. Br.Aplt.22-27. Inconsistencies are not enough to
disturb the jury’s verdict—the inconsistencies must be improbable with no
other circumstantial or direct evidence supporting the verdict. State v. Prater,
2017 UT 13, ¶¶32,42 392 P.3d 398. But Defendant’s argument focuses only on
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alleged inconsistencies and ignores the totality of the evidence supporting his
identification. See MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶57 (To prove guilt, the State
may present “a mosaic of circumstantial evidence.”). And as explained,
ample evidence supports Defendant’s identification. Thus, Defendant’s claim
fails.
B. The trial court did not plainly err by not sua sponte taking the
obstruction of justice charge from the jury.
For the first time on appeal, Defendant challenges his obstruction of
justice conviction, arguing that there was insufficient identification evidence
to show that he discarded the gun. Br.Aplt.27-30. Defendant’s claim fails
because he cannot show plain error—obvious, prejudicial error.
1. Defendant’s claim is unpreserved.
Defendant argues that his claim was preserved by his trial counsel’s
directed verdict motion. Defendant is mistaken.
A party generally cannot raise an issue on appeal that it did not
properly preserve in the trial court. Oseguera v. State, 2014 UT 31,¶10, 332 P.3d
963. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must present the issue in “‘the
district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].’”
Id. (quoting Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, ¶45, 323 P.3d 998). In other words,
a party’s objection must be both timely and specific. See id. The specificity
requirement prevents a party from raising an issue on one ground but
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arguing another ground on appeal. See id. (party objecting “on one ground
does not preserve any alternative grounds for objection for appeal”) (quoting
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶17, 192 P.3 867).
In his directed verdict motion, Defendant argued that “there’s not
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that [Defendant] is, in fact, the person that fired at the officer that day.” R1225.
Defendant did not argue, as he does on appeal, that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that he was the person who discarded the gun—the
evidentiary basis for the obstruction charge. Br.Aplt.27-30. Defendant did not
present this issue to the trial court, and the trial court did not have the
opportunity to rule on it. See Oseguera, 2014 UT 31,¶10. Defendant’s claim is
thus unpreserved. See id.
2. Defendant has not shown—and cannot show—
that the trial court should have taken the
obstruction of justice charge from the jury on its
own motion.
To prevail on a preserved insufficiency claim on appeal, Defendant
must show that the “evidence…is sufficiently inconclusive” or “inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt.”
State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ¶65, 27 P.3d 1115 (citations and quotations omitted).
When, as here, Defendant’s claim is unpreserved, Defendant’s burden is even
higher. Defendant must also show that the “insufficiency was so obvious and
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fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury.” State
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶17, 10 P.3d 346.
Defendant has shown no obvious and fundamental insufficiency of the
evidence. O’Gwin testified that, and his dash cam captured, Defendant,
shooting his gun toward Tsouaras, then jumping the retaining wall between
the tire store and the Park Station Apartments. R1213-14; SE147. Defendant’s
gun and magazine were found practically next to where he jumped the
retaining wall. R912-13; SE144.
And as explained, Defendant’s identification is supported by the
surveillance and dash cam videos, the seven witnesses descriptions of
Defendant, that he was the only person in the area, he fled from police, he
had access to and familiarity with guns and ammunition, and that he was
arrested near the shooting scene only twenty-two minutes after the shooting,
his hands bloodied and a bullet in his pocket. R795,797,855,941,953-54,97273,1002,1105-14,1160,1162-64,1195,1210-13; SE12,121-122,147,151-153,158160189. Given this evidence, the trial court did not err—plainly or otherwise—
by not sua sponte taking the charge from the jury.
Regardless, Defendant argues that this evidence is insufficient to prove
that Defendant discarded the gun. Br.Aplt.31-32. But direct evidence of
Defendant discarding the gun was not required. See MacNeill, 2017 UT App
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48, ¶57 (circumstantial evidence alone sufficient to prove guilt). The totality
of the circumstantial evidence was more than enough to prove Defendant’s
identity. See id. And the jury agreed. “It is the exclusive function of the jury
to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”
Mead, 2001 UT 58, ¶67. That is exactly what the jury did here. See State v.
Johnson, 2015 UT App 312, ¶12, 365 P.3d 730 (a jury is not obligated to believe
Defendant’s version of events). Thus, Defendant cannot show that the
evidence was insufficient, let alone obviously and fundamentally so. See
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶17.
C. The trial court acted well within its discretion when it denied
Defendant’s motion to exclude the Federal bullet because the
bullet was evidence that linked Defendant to the crimes.4
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not excluding the Federal
bullet found in his pocket when he was arrested. He argues that the bullet
was inadmissible under rule 404(b) as evidence of another crime. He argues
that the bullet was evidence of his proclivities. Br.Aplt.30-44. Defendant’s
claim fails because rule 404 does not apply to evidence that is intrinsic to the

4

This Point responds to Defendant’s Point II. See Br. Aplt. 30-44.
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charged crime.

And the Federal bullet was intrinsic, not extrinsic, to

Defendant’s crimes.5
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that evidence “of a
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity
with the character.” Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1). To determine whether a
defendant’s other bad acts are admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court
must determine whether the evidence is offered for a genuine, noncharacter
purpose; whether the evidence is relevant under rule 402 to a contested issue;
and whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed
by the risk of unfair prejudice under rule 403. See State v. Lucero, 2014 UT
15,¶¶14, 17, 328 P.3d 841 (abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017
UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016).
But it is “well-settled” that rule 404(b) applies to the admissibility of
evidence extrinsic to the charged offenses and does not apply to “evidence
that is intrinsic to the crime charged.” United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d
1309,1314 (10th Cir. 2009) accord United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822,831 (10th

Below, the State argued that the bullet was admissible under Utah R.
Evid. 404(b). R955-64. This Court can affirm any on basis apparent in the
record. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶13, 52 P.3d 1158.
5

-29-

Cir. 1999). See also Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶14 n.7 (explaining that “rule 404(b)
applies only “‘to evidence that is extrinsic to the crime charged’”) (quoting
United States v. Mower, 351 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1230 (D. Utah 2005)); State v.
Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ¶65, 256 P.3d 1102 (same). Evidence is extrinsic
“[w]hen the other crimes or wrongs occur at different times and under
different circumstances from the offense charged.” Burke, 2011 UT App 168,
¶65. Evidence is intrinsic if it is “directly connected to the factual
circumstances of the crime,” Parker, 553 F.3d at 1314 (citation omitted);
“necessary to complete the story of the crime,” United States v. McKinley, 647
Fed. Appx. 957,962 (11thCir. 2016); “inextricably intertwined with the
evidence of the crime charged,” Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ¶65 (quotation and
citation omitted); or provides “contextual or background information to the
jury.” United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1212 (10th Cir. 2011).
Here, the Federal bullet was intrinsic, not extrinsic, to Defendant’s
crimes. It was not another crime or wrong that occurred at a different time
and circumstance from the offenses charged. It was part of Defendant’s
crimes. See Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ¶65.
Twenty-two minutes after Defendant shot Tsouras, police found the
bullet in Defendant’s pocket when they arrested and searched him.
R1002,1160. Various calibers of the same brand of ammunition were found in
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the truck Defendant stole and parked at the business center. R1105-14,113640; SE160-189. This evidence ties Defendant to the business center, where he
ran from Clark, just before shooting Tsouras. R854; SE11. The bullet also links
him to the stolen truck and the guns and ammunition inside of it. One of the
9 mm bullets found inside of the truck matched one of the bullets fired at
Tsouras. R1146-48; SE189. And the truck contained various calibers of
Winchester ammunition, the same manufacturer of the other five bullets shot
at Tsouras. R1110; SE173-176. By linking Defendant to the guns and
ammunition in the truck, the State provided further proof that it was
Defendant who shot at Tsouras.
Additionally, because Defendant had the bullet in his pocket and the
truck he stole was filled with guns and ammunition proved that he had access
to guns and was familiar with them. Defendant’s access and familiarity is
further proof his identity as the shooter. Thus, the Federal bullet was directly
connected to the factual circumstances of Defendant’s crimes, “inextricably
intertwined” with the evidence, and provided the jury with contextual
information. See Irving, 665 F.3d 1184; Parker, 553 F.3d at 1314; Burke, 2011 UT
App 168, ¶65; McKinley, 647 Fed. Appx. at 962.
Defendant also argues that the trial court should have excluded the
evidence under rule 403. But he has not shown that the potential for unfair
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prejudice substantially outweighed the bullet’s probative value. As argued,
finding the bullet in Defendant’s pocket was evidence linking him to the
crime. The “prejudice,” then, was that it was further evidence of his guilt—
it helped establish his familiarity with firearms, and more importantly, it was
further proof linking him to the truck where police found other ammunition
that more directly tied Defendant to the shooting. Evidence of guilt is not
unfairly prejudicial.6 United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th
Cir.2001) (“evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is
detrimental to a party’s case”).
Defendant also has not shown that admitting the bullet prejudiced him.
To prove prejudice, Defendant must show that there was a reasonable
likelihood of a different result had the trial court not admitted the bullet. State
v. Courtney, 2017 UT App 172, ¶22, --P.2d --. Given the totality of the evidence,

Defendant’s argument looks to the Shickles factors. Br.Aplt.37-39. He
says that State did not need the evidence because other evidence linked him
to the truck and the bullet had the potential to lead the jury into
“overmastering hostility.” Id. But the Shickles factors have been disavowed
as the standard for determining admissibility under rule 403. State v. Lucero,
2014 UT 15, ¶32, 17, 328 P.3d 841 (abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016). And the supreme court has expressly
rejected the “overmastering hostility” inquiry. State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95,
¶20, 367 P.3d 981
6
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the admission of the bullet did not create a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome.
The jurors heard from 18 witnesses over three days and reviewed 191
exhibits. R760-1364; SE1-191. The jurors heard testimony that Defendant stole
guns and ammunition from the truck owner’s home, many of the guns and
ammunition in the stolen truck were not the truck owner’s, the truck owner
never owned 9 mm ammunition—the caliber of ammunition used to shoot
and shoot at Tsouras—and did not own the 9 mm ammunition in the truck.
R1122-1130. Along with the guns and ammunition in the truck, Defendant’s
identification and Ipad were in the truck. R1104-05; SE73. Thus, the jury could
reasonably infer that Defendant owned the guns and ammunition not owned
by the truck owner and Defendant was familiar with and had access to
weapons. See Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶18 (jury can draw reasonable inferences
from circumstantial evidence).
Of the exhibits, the jurors heard the dispatch recording of Tsouras
calling out “shots fired,” saw photos and video surveillance of Defendant at
the business center, the dash cam video of Defendant firing a gun towards
Tsouras and running from O’Gwin, 19 photos of bullet casings, 62 photos of
Tsouras’s bullet-ridden patrol car, 36 photos of guns and ammunition, photos
of Defendant’s bloodied hands, photos of Tsouras’ bullet damaged uniform,
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the bullet-pierced Kevlar plate from Tsouras’s bulletproof vest, and
numerous bullets and casings recovered from the shooting and stolen vehicle
scene. SE11-189.
Given this evidence, Defendant cannot show prejudice. And, the
exclusion of one more bullet found in Defendant’s pocket at the time of his
arrest did not create a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
Thus, Defendant’s claim fails.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO MERGE HIS FOUR FELONY DISCHARGE OF A
FIREARM CONVICTIONS WITH HIS ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED
MURDER CONVICTION BECAUSE THE AGGRAVATED MURDER
STATUTE EXPLICITLY PROHIBITS MERGER. 7
Below, Defendant argued that all five of his felony discharge of a
firearm convictions should merge with his attempted aggravated murder
conviction. R435. The State argued in the alternative that if any counts merge,
one count could merge based on the State’s closing argument. R448-51. The
trial court agreed with the State and merged one of Defendant’s felony
discharge of a firearm convictions with his attempted murder conviction.
R490-91. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it did
not merge his four remaining felony discharge of a firearm convictions with
his attempted aggravated murder conviction. Br.Aplt.44-54. Defendant’s
claims fail. 8
The aggravated murder statute expressly precludes felony discharge
of a firearm from merging. The aggravated merger statute states that:

7

This point responds to Defendant’s Point III. See Br. Aplt. 44-54

As explained below, merger is inapplicable, thus, Defendant received
a windfall when the trial court partially granted his motion.
8
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Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2)
that constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime
of aggravated murder. A person who is convicted of aggravated
murder, based on an aggravating circumstance . . . that
constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and
punished for, the separate offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(5)(West 2015).
Subsection (1)(j) lists, among other crimes, felony discharge of a firearm
as an aggravating circumstance. Id. (j)(xvii). Felony discharge of a firearm is
a separate offense from aggravated murder. See Utah Code Ann. §76-10-508.1
(West 2017). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, Defendant’s
convictions cannot merge.
And the Utah Supreme Court agrees. In State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶67,
361 P.3d 104, Bond sought to merge his aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated murder convictions. The supreme court held that under the
aggravated murder statute, the offenses did not merge because the statute
exempted aggravated kidnapping from merging. Id. at ¶¶69-70. The court
explained that the “plain language” of the aggravated murder statute “can
leave no doubt” that an aggravating circumstance “does not merge with the
homicide conviction.” Id. at ¶71.
Like Bond, here, Defendant’s crimes did not merge because felony
discharge of a firearm, like aggravated kidnapping, is listed as an aggravating
circumstance in the aggravated murder statute. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
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202(1)(j)(v), (1)(j)(xvii). Thus, like Bond, the aggravated murder statute
precludes felony discharge of a firearm from merging with aggravated
murder.
Moreover, it is immaterial that Defendant was convicted of attempted
aggravated murder, not aggravated murder. The offenses do not merge
because “[a]ttempt crimes,” like attempted aggravated murder, are only
“derivatives of completed crimes, and the express language of both the
completed crime statute and the attempt statute determines the elements of
the attempt crime.” State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ¶13, 82 P.3d 1106. Thus, a
conviction for attempted aggravated murder must satisfy the elements of the
aggravated murder statute, “with the obvious exception that the murder
need not be completed, and the attempt statute.” Id.
In sum, the trial court did not err by not merging Defendant’s
attempted aggravated murder and felony discharge of a firearm convictions
because the statute explicitly prohibits it.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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